**CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE: WAR IN UKRAINE**

The continuing Russia-Ukrainian War saw a significant intensification on February 24 2022 when Russia began an all-out assault on Ukraine. The operation was foreshadowed by a protracted Russian military preparation (beginning in early 2021) as well as several Russian requests for security precautions and statutory restrictions preventing Ukraine embracing NATO. War is fundamentally about power, who2has it, who2doesn't, and who2can successfully wield it (Yekelchyk, 2022, p. 181). The conflict in Ukraine is no different. However, the results of the conflict's first few months have shocked numerous analysts and called into question several long-held beliefs about the relative strength of the military and the economy Perhaps unexpectedly, Russia's military strength did not enable it to achieve its primary purposes. Nevertheless, Ukrainian troops have held2their own, even pushing Russian forces back in certain areas. A few of the reason can be found in changes in2the nature and application of dominance that have occurred during the last years (Kavanagh, 2022).

First2development in the Ukraine war has been the widespread importance of non-state organizations that are capable of acting independently on the global arena. In recent times, these entities have grown in number, autonomy, and the sorts of dominance they are empowered to exercise. Their activities limit state discretion while also expanding state authority. One illustration is the sway of transnational companies, which, in part as a result of their expansion in terms of magnitude, income, and reach as2well as their changing legal recognition, had an unparalleled impact on the Western rebuttal to Russia's attack (Cohenn, 2022).

Additionally, non-state organizations have wielded their influence at pace and in manners that were not feasible before social networking sites. Individuals in Ukraine have acted as communicators and uncensored reliable information providers owing to the country's massive social network utilization and rising Internet penetration, while those living outside have coordinated worldwide rescue operations. Governments that are ideally equipped to benefit from non-state organization initiatives may have a clear edge when trying to transmit influence across the state (Cooper, 2022, p. 45).

As demonstrated throughout the war by the capability of Ukrainian President2Volodymyr Zelenskyy to leverage on community initiatives via media campaigning, this technique might be particularly crucial for smaller nations that might normally have less constricted influence. But there are concerns associated with these non-state entities' increasing independence and influence. Governments may occasionally try to influence non-state organizations to take political action, but they will occasionally also have to find measures to control or constrain these organizations' actions. This will be a difficult balance to strike, particularly given how unpredictable the activities and even the existence of such organizations can be (Janet, 2022, p. 56).

The second2development is the degree to which interstate ties act as crucial reservoirs of power that has a significant influence on how conflicts turn out. Government strength is generally evaluated by evaluating at its resources, including its GDP or array of weapons. Nevertheless, as internationalization and technological advancements progress interconnectivity among nations render it cost - effective and simpler for commodities, services, and relevant data to flow throughout borders, partnerships like collaborations and trade connections have become just as crucial to any evaluation of a country's power as2capability-based metrics (Liasheva, 2022).

Numerous instances of broader, more intertwined ties acting as both2sources and restraints on power to influence developments may be seen in the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. As an illustration, the US and its NATO countries have used their solid political, economic, and military ties to enforce extensive sanctions and deploy a large amount of military help (Stephen, 2022). In addition, political linkages between NATO partners and Ukraine2are another illustration of relational strength that has allowed Ukraine to acquire financial and military help, intelligence and infrastructural aid, and geopolitical prestige, all of2which have proven crucial to its2success to date. In addition, as seen in the discussions over the course of the war, these ties foster obligations that may solidify with time and constrain everyone's ability to make decisions (Jacobs, 2022, p. 209-249).

Drones are one of the USA's game-changing2military tools. In Ukraine, drones are altering the dynamics of conflict by giving soldiers a reasonably inexpensive means of observing what's happening and launching attacks on pricey tanks and artillery. Everything from modest commercial2drones to the powerful military Bayraktar2TB2 developed in Turkey is being used by Ukrainian army (Shankland, 2022). The US Defense2Department announced on Thursday that 600 more2AeroVironment Switchblade2drones had been dispatched to assist the Ukrainian army in fending off the Russian invasion. From the 1002drones the US supplied in March, that represents a significant boost (Shankland, 2022).

The drones can hover above a battleground as "loitering weapons" before turning into actual missiles that strike particular sites. They are part of the Pentagon's latest $8002million in defense aid to Ukraine, which increases the nation's overall security support commitments to $2.6 billion. The US has also provided an unspecified amount of AeroVironment2Puma drones, which can hover over a battleground for days and aid troops in aiming Switchblades at2their intended sights. The 5.5-pound2Switchblade 300 and the 50-pound2Switchblade 600 are both manufactured by AeroVironment and are intended for use against tanks and artillery and infantry, respectively (Shankland, 2022).

The final development in the present Ukraine war is that several of the most significant types of power have not been based solely on raw force generated from military capabilities2or economic resources. They are also no instances of soft power, which affects people via rules and ideas in the Ukraine war. Rather, they have2been forms of2power that blur the line between the two (Linkhoeva, 2022, p. 221). The United States' retaliation to Russia's incursion has focused on tactics that integrate soft power which are U.S. brands, businesses, and even dollars with2more coercive measures.

First, while2sanctions are generally regarded as a form of2hard power, the organizations withdrawal from Russia magnified both the2hard economic consequences of the sanctions and also the inferred denunciation and stigmatizing of Russian deeds, owing to the well-publicized2exits of big corporate including Starbucks2and McDonald's (Kavanagh, 2022). In a related vein, US attempts to isolate Russia from foreign exchange markets have depended on US vast resources, which stems from both the country's economic strength (hard power) and the reputational2power and trustworthiness of the2US dollar (soft power). Furthermore, actions by sporting organizations across the globe to blacklist Russian sportsmen and suspend tournaments in Russia2have had an identical impact, integrating a financial punishment with a social and2cultural censure in a single action (Linkhoeva, 2022, p. 221).

To conclude, some experts claim that the globe has reentered2a cold war era characterized by bipolarity and conflict involving autocracy2and democracy. However, the increased diversity of non-state entities, increased interdependence, and abundance of technologies that integrate hard and2soft power indicate otherwise. Rather, the globe appears to be shifting to a super competitive climate in which dominance is more dispersed, flexible, and cross-cutting2than during the2Cold War. This may result in increased international insecurity and war, plus a bunch of new issues for countries. However, it also opens up new possibilities, particularly for smaller governments opposing larger ones2and non-state entities pursuing dominance. Legislators will need to take into account and integrate the numerous non-state players that have the capacity to wield power while also leveraging connections and capacities to persuade in order to gain the upper hand.

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