**HUMAN SECURITY INFLUENCE THE APPROACH AND CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL SECURITY**

Introduction

Human security is a revolutionary invention in comprehending international security. Human security is regarded as having its roots in the Human Development2Report, which the United Nations2Development Programme (UNDP) first released in 1994. Human Security was one of the redesigned international variables that developed after tensions about the2Cold War had subsided. These featured the dismissal of growth in the economy as the primary metric of prosperity, the rising number of domestic disputes, the rise of global threats brought on by globalization, and the focus placed on human rights2and humanitarian action following the Cold War (Collins, 2022). This essay explores how this novel principle of human security has affected the global security discourse and examines if it is having the expected developmental effects.

The dynamic aspect of human security is the fundamental conceptual issue. current  interpretations of human security "often seem to be astonishingly broad and unspecific, embracing everything from2physical security to2mental well-being, which gives lawmakers little guidelines in the setting priorities of contending policy objectives and scholars little understanding of what, precisely, is to be explored," according to Paris (2001, p. 87).

 King and Murray (2002, p. 518) take a more encouraging perspective by proposing a "simple, precise, and measurable description" of human security2as "the amount of future2life decades experienced outside a situation of "generalized poverty." An individual who "falls underneath the barrier of any major aspect of human well-being" is said to be in generalized2poverty. The next step is to determine the fundamental spheres of human2well-being, the metrics that can be applied to each sphere, and the poverty2threshold limits. King and Murray enhance the conversation in this direction by broadening the idea of human security2and demonstrating how that might be applied to empirical investigation. Nevertheless, they strongly adhere to the UNDP's methodology in one crucial area by maintaining that human security may be quantified by combining security variables from many industries.

Security and Human Security

In essence, the idea of security is up for debate. Interpretations span from the traditional2state-centric explanation of a comparative freedom from military conflict, combined with a reasonably high assumption that surrender will not be the result of any conflict that should take place; via systemic notions inferring both coercive methods to check2an aggressor and2all demeanor of appeals, reinforced by the possibility of mutually beneficial outcomes, to reshape animosity into collaboration; to the evaluation of insecurity or risks, both international and domestic (Macfarlane, 2004, p. 368). The idea of complete certainty of triumph if one declares war2in the2former and the collective defense concept and logic of great certainty of loss of an invader in the later highlight the discrepancy between state2and systemic securities. However, over the2past 50 years, the mainstream of academia has begun to recognize and institutionalize global conflicts research and security courses (Krause, 2004, p. 367).

Research into the origins of major conflicts and efforts to lessen their frequency and impact have dominated work in these subjects for the majority of the post-Second2World War era. Although collaboration may only be brief, conflict is considered as unavoidable. In fact, not all confrontation needs to be viewed negatively. It is an essential component of societal development and one of the routes to maturity for both people and communities. Therefore, big intergovernmental conflicts, the most severe kind of conflict, have occupied the minds of classical security scholars and professionals (Burgess & Owen, 2014, p. 29). The principles of military capabilities2both attacking and defending allocation and stability of power2in the global structure, particularly in aspects of polarity and presence in the grip of the dominant nations, and strategy prescription in2terms of the strategic ramifications of these factors such as offensive (projecting power), defensive, and2deterrent spending tend to be the main points of contention (Burgess & Owen, 2014, p. 29).

Nevertheless, real innovation on security has progressively risen to the spotlight in the sector, with contribution from both scholars and experts in global institutions such as the2United Nations, including from middle great powers particularly Canada and2Norway, and moreover, maybe most significantly, from Japan. Critical and2postmodern viewpoints have a propensity to view security as liberation, or the freedom to do as one sees fit. The constructivists2of the Copenhagen2School created the notion of securitization, investigating how particular situations are converted into a question of national security2by people functioning on favor of a state (Akaha, 1991, p. 324). Under the leadership of Prime Minister2Zenko Suzuki, Japan established a "comprehensive security” strategy in the early21980s. Comprehensive security emphasized the need to2take into account additional factors essential to national cohesion, including food, power generation, the eco system, communication, and2social security, in addition to looking beyond the2traditional security components of individual2self-defense by concentrating on international and regional2security protocols. This overtly inclusive strategy, which placed a strong emphasis on multilateralism, may be directly traced to2Japanese security thought from the 1950s (Macfarlane, 2004, p. 368).

Food insecurity, disease, and natural catastrophes cause more deaths than military conflict, mass slaughter, and terrorist acts combined, according to adherents of the "broad" liberty from want notion of human security, which was outlined in the UNDP's Human2Development Report2of 1994 and the2Commission on2Human Security's 2003 document, Human Security2Now (Hensel, 2013). Despite this, all advocates of human security concur that the2protection of persons is the fundamental objective and that there should be a clear separation between human security2and state security, even2though the2two may be considered as compatible rather than in opposition to one another (Akaha, 1991, p. 324). Human security is concerned with defending people and societies against threats to their welfare or even their very life, while national security is more concerned with defending the state against foreign threats. The phrase, albeit still fairly new, is now frequently utilized to refer to the complexity of interconnected risks to a person's personal safety brought on by international conflict, insurrection, massacres, cultural genocide, forced displacement, environmental catastrophes, and epidemic diseases. Elements of security relating to food, healthcare, the ecosystem, societies, governance, and civil rights are some of the definitions with the largest scope (Krause, 2004, p. 367).

Development and Human Security

Human security, defined as the2protection of people, and human development, defined as the satisfaction of fundamental human wants, is closely related concepts in both principles and application. Human development2and securities are both focused on mankind. They oppose the conventional view of security and development in the appropriate sub-disciplines: on the one side, state security, and on2the other, liberal2growth in the economy (Thomas, 1999). Both emphasize that individuals should only ever be thought of as resources, never as final ends, and both regard individuals as agents2who should2be given the freedom to take participate in the procedure of meeting their personal wants. Both viewpoints are multifaceted and take into account both person's physical and2material needs as well2as their inherent decency. Both place obligations on the larger international community (THOMAS & TOW, 2002, p. 177).

Human security2and development can be understood as jointly promoting on the positive2side of the interactions. Therefore, World Bank2President Robert Zoellick highlighted the need for a deeper connection amongst security, administration, and development2in his January22009 keynote to the U.S. University of Peace. He also suggested that scheduling of strategies to meet these demands should be concurrent. A tranquil atmosphere enables people and administrations to shift their attention from merely surviving to considering how to improve their circumstances. Similarly, when a society grows, it can finance more colleges, de-mining activities, internal security procedures, hospitals, social programs, and physicians, all of whom have the ability to improve the overall population's level of human security (Buzan, 2004, p. 369).

On the down side, we won't enjoy security2without growth, development2without security, and2without regard for human rights, as ex UN Secretary-General2Kofi Annan noted in Larger Freedom. Warfare hinders development, while lack of development can result in confrontation. Until all of these factors are addressed, none can prosper. The negative amplification of insecurity and2underdevelopment can persist long after the public end of battles, and post-conflict growth has in fact become "the standard rather than2the anomaly" due to the occurrence of warfare2around the world (Human Security Centre, 2005).

Risks to life and2well-being in the post-bellum period include the dissolution of rule of law, the dissemination of disease brought on by overpopulation in refugee camps, poor nourishment, infrastructure failure, a lack of medical equipment (although oddly, this is frequently accompanied by an emergence of illegal substances), and ongoing criminal intrusions on civilian populaces. Other post-bellum dangers include joblessness, forced migration, homelessness, interrupted business activity, and economic stagnation. In additional to these complications, the residue of lethal relics of war, such as missiles, explosives, artillery, minefield, or cluster bombs and their2sub-munitions, poses the most imminent danger to human security and development in numerous post-conflict locations (Junne & Verkoren, 2005).

In the immediate wake of both domestic and external disputes, combustible leftovers of military conflict including mine fields, explosive device armaments, and explosive materials such as missiles, artillery rounds, and grenade launchers that have been used but ceased to blow up are frequent, causing havoc for years after armed conflict have ended. They make it more difficult for refugees2and internally forced to flee people to revert back to their homes safely, destroy key infrastructure2for economic growth, drive up the expense of reconstruction, and obstruct the use of resources needed for sustainable wellbeing like sources of2water and irrigation facilities, and pose deadly obstacles to land utilization (Burkhardt, 2017). They obstruct the use of land for farming, livestock, residential or relocation, and business. Additionally, they discourage economic growth and governmental and non - governmental investment by increasing unpredictability, expenses, and delays brought on by their alleged existence. Children are injured or killed while they are being salvaged for scrap materials, harming otherwise useful members of the community. The United Nations2Development Program estimates that minefields affect up to 78 countries and 85 nations by explosives remains of military conflict (Finnemore, 2013).

Human Security as a Dual Responsibility to Protect and Provide

This paper reiterates the idea of human security by reaching back to the origins, building on earlier discussions. Whatever is stated, human security should be a subclass of security, which is traditionally described as being free from risk, stress, worry, and other negative emotions. This emphasis on absent elements suggests that the inverted or negative way in which the notion was stated by UNDP in 1994—"freedom from" a specific list of obstacles and dangers—is substantially valid (Holzgrefe, 2006). Then, human security must delineate a zone in which2each and every person can exercise such freedoms. This gives the concept a personal foundation. Human security is a trait of distinct individuals rather than a property of subgroups or divisions (Thomas, 1999).

While human security shares many similarities with similar ideas of human empowerment and prosperity, the lack of dangers dimension indicates that it is actually quite distinct. Security is a constrained, even ill-defined concept. The larger human rights discussion incorporates concepts of empowerment and involvement, which, if prohibited, could undoubtedly result in a life that is less2rich and meaningful, but would not inevitably result in one that is shorter or harder. Practical activity in their name is complex and can result in accusations of or actual crusading due to disagreements within the dialogue and in policy debates over what defines a civil right, which2rights are significant, and what2can be undertaken to defend and enhance them (Walzer, 2008).

Setting the foundations for societies to thrive and for their residents to live "better" or at least2better off is part of the larger development debate. Furthermore, if development moves beyond a relatively basic threshold of financial capabilities, it may not do much to safeguard private individuals and may even put them in risk. This is because associating richness with well-being is controversial. Concepts of human2empowerment and prospering are considerably more expansive and encompassing, leading toward the decent life. While recognizing human security2as a fundamental principle, they go beyond it to create much more comprehensive conceptualizations of the human predicament. That is not what human security entails. It primarily addresses what we mean when we talk about a sanctuary (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007).

Freedom from fear concentrates on actual physical risks that are felt on a personal level and do not always affect large communities. The paradigm situation is conflict, and this is where a lot of discussion is focused. Nevertheless, the list is not exhausted by warfare; rather, fresh challenges in the modern world must be added (Seckinelgin, 2012). One is the potential for contamination due to contact to various health risks, such as those caused by HIV/AIDS, radiation from nuclear power plants, or more contemporary viruses like tuberculosis, influenza and Covid-19. Threats of unfair coercion and forcible relocation are among the others. Individuals must be protected against all of these possible risks if they are to live without fear. Freedom from want brings up the issue of basic necessities (Seckinelgin, 2012).

According to Doyal and Gough (1991), "all human freedom should be judged by gauging the extent to which such fulfillment has transpired." People "have a right to the maximum fulfilment of [such] demands." The idea that individual want is both objective2and universal is crucial, and this2is a cardinal element. Doyal and Gough argue that since "all people have the same possibility to be victimized or to thrive," they should all possess basic human necessities. This is in opposition to drastic democrats, critiques of neocolonialism, and ideologues2from the New2Right and Marxist belief systems who maintain that the idea of human wants is subjective or2culturally relationship (Doyal & Gough, 1991). 11 primary components for Doyal and Gough can be divided into two slightly overlapping categories. The five components that cover fundamental requirements for physical2health are: a non-hazardous workplace surroundings, a non-hazardous2physical ecosystem, appropriate safety shelter, and quality healthcare. The six components—security in childhood, important early interactions, physical security, financial stability, adequate education, and effective contraception and childbearing—address the fundamental requirements for mental2health (Doyal & Gough, 1991).

Now that we have turned our focus to how others may help secure these two freedoms, human security concentrates on what governments and the larger international community can do for people everywhere because everyone has specific rights and obligations simply by merit of being a person (Pasha, 2013). In other terms, the important issues revolve on fundamental rights and obligations placed on others. This is a different take from focusing on the kinds of political freedoms (freedom of expression, of gathering, to run for office, etc.) that are frequently promoted by outside organizations aiming to spur transformation in a precarious state. As a result, they could be seen as less politically motivated than a liberal "crusade" to alter the political structures of the target countries (McRae & Hubert, 2001). However, when a society's leadership fails to uphold their duty to ensure the human security of their members, concerns are raised about the obligations placed on the global community. Reinterpreting state rights as advantages given to them in confidence by their citizenry is necessary for this (Pasha, 2013).

Throughout the Cold War, all of the main nations' decision-making was driven, according to Coper (2002, p. 7), by concerns of country's interest. Amoral international policy, at least in2Western liberal countries, became unsustainable with the conclusion of the Cold2War and the growth of media coverage and distribution capacities. The guiding principles of that period may thus be considered as no longer being appropriate for the administration of global politics, country interest may2no longer is an adequate legitimate guideline for conduct, and even the long-held normative significance of the sovereign government may be open to challenge. Furthermore, going back in time, the Nuremberg2trials in 1945–46 were the ones who first place restrictions to national sovereignty. States were no longer free to treat their populations however they pleased (Coper, 2002, p.7). At roughly the same period, the Preamble of2the 1945 UN Charter reiterates belief in fundamental2human rights devoid of prejudice. The phrasing of Articles 1(3), 55, and256 also reflects this. The General Assembly adopted the historic Universal Declaration2of Human Rights in21948.

Hans (2018, p. 366) states that following accords and resolutions strengthened individual rights over the years. The UN General Assembly approved the International2Covenants on Civil and Political2Rights and Economic, Social, and Cultural2Rights in21966. Eventually, the International Criminal court2has ruled that all nations, even those with little interaction with the world community, are required to "penalize and avert genocide" in accordance with the Convention2on the Prevention and2Punishment of2the Crime of2Genocide, that has been enacted by 140 nations. The trend of normatively changing from a focus on individual liberty and sovereign rights to one on their responsibilities to citizens and2the rights of individuals against governments has accelerated post - cold War Era.

Finnemore (2013) contends that two characteristics of the worldwide pattern of military involvement in the2post-Cold War era stick out: most of it is multinational, and usually the geopolitics or economic objectives of the2interveners are insignificant. She specifically mentions the high expenses of the expeditions to Somalia (UNOSOM II) and2Cambodia (UNTAC) as moderating against the economic self-interest of2intervening governments, which provide the deciding factor as to whether to assist. When the global community chose not to help during the genocide2in Rwanda in21994, national interests took precedence. Nevertheless, criticism from domestic and global popular perception, fueled by news from NGOs2and the press, eventually forced the UN and2member countries to take some sort of intervention (McRae & Hubert, 2001).

 The fact that other Security2Council members knew that if genocide were to be established, international legislation would oblige them to respond irrespective of the expenses and the demands of their own national interests also kept them from acknowledging that genocide was happening (Octavio, 2008, p. 265).Kosovo was the first expressly foreign intervention in2the post-Cold War era, and diplomatic pressure for2intervention in Kosovo2was strengthened as a result of remorse over Rwanda's inaction. The willingness to participate in this conflict differed most sharply with the hesitation in regard to Rwanda and2Bosnia, as did the relative lack of concerns of tangible country's interest in comparison with the Gulf. Thus, it should come as no surprise that realists like Henry Kissinger2and Colin Gray opposed the intervention from2a theoretical perspective, claiming that no important military or geopolitical interests of the United States were at risk (Octavio, 2008, p. 265).

When the International2Commission on Intervention2and State Sovereignty published a substantial document entitled The Responsibility to2Protect in 2001, support for pledges to live free from fear reached new levels (Hurd, 2018, p. 667). By declaring a readiness to "take timely and effective cooperation and coordination for this goal, via the Security Council, where peaceful solutions prove insufficient and federal agencies are obviously unable to do it," this declaration specifically endorsed humanitarian intervention. The document went so far as to provide a section (6.28–6.40) on2what can be undertaken "When the Security2Council Fails to Act," after which it went on to categorize and describe possible uses of armed force with little respect for the concepts of state sovereignty and2non-intervention. This paradigm shift has acquired pace and global prominence in the intervening years (Hurd, 2018, p. 667).

Admittedly, in reaction to this change in international norms, world heads of state came to an agreement on an "obligation to protect" during the High-Level2Plenary Meeting for the22005 World2Summit (September 14–16). This agreement included a "clear and precise acknowledgement by all2government entities of the concerted global obligation to defend societies from mass slaughter, extrajudicial killings, ethno cultural cleansing, and human rights violations." The Security2Council of the United2Nations consequently dedicated itself to action by adopting Resolution 1674 on April 28, 2006, which "Reiterated the regulations of paragraphs2138 and2139 of the22005 World Summit2Outcome Document pertaining the obligation to defend citizens from mass slaughter, extrajudicial killings, forced displacement, and human rights violations" (Zyla, 2019, p. 181).

Nevertheless, the risk to human security posed by nonviolent protests and the associated passivity or ineptitude of governments may potentially be bigger, certainly in regards to a freedom from2want, than the danger posed by violent protests in regards to a freedom from2fear. Therefore, it can be claimed that a duty to provide stems from the obligation states have toward their inhabitants to meet both their basic necessities and their legal rights. Moreover, this obligation might be said to2devolve to the global community when nations take no action, parallel to the obligation to protect obligations (Benedek, 2012, p. 7).

Freedom from2want is starting to take precedence over freedom from fear2in both the scholarly research and policy discussions. Given that hunger, sickness, and natural catastrophes collectively kill much more individuals than warfare, extermination, and terrorist attacks put together, the emphasis on freedom from2want as essential to human security is justified (Krause, 2009, p. 65). Additionally, fewer people die in wars, and the world population is more liable than in2previous eras to be aware of internal aggressive acts and to take action against them. It is for this purpose that the most outspoken proponents of human security are starting to stir up controversy by advocating for "aid invasions" when nations deliberately, negligently, incompetently, or intentionally have a significant detrimental influence on the human security of their population (Paris, 2001, p. 87).

In response to recent political developments in Asia, several of these problems have come to light with a lot of momentum. Undoubtedly, disputes over domestic and international reactions to the disastrous May 2008 cyclone2in Myanmar and Chinese govern in Tibet (which sparked violent protests in Tibet2itself, in the immediate neighborhood, and as a consequence of the Olympic2torch relay2across the globe), along with serious civil disorder in Thailand, the2Philippines, and Malaysia, gave a sense of gratification and urgency2to discussions about the conflict between government constitutional powers, civil rights, and the obligations of the global community (Park, 2013, p. 51). In 2009, there were more riots in China, in this occasion in the Muslim area of Xinjiang. International human security problems again received a lot of attention, with condemnation of the deportation of refugees2from N.Korea by China and the minority Hmong from2Laos by Thailand (Howe, 2013, p. 226). Furthermore, it became apparent over time that several of the survivors of both the earthquake that struck areas of China's Sichuan2province in the2same month as2the 2008 Myanmar cyclone were being persecuted repeatedly by government agencies that were either incapable or reluctant to cater for them.

North Korea serves as an example of the nuanced interplay between conventional and unconventional security viewpoints, with human security playing a crucial part. Resource for development may be diverted for national security issues and military priorities, and a tolerant political environment may be created where2national security is prioritized over humanitarian law (Ireson, 2013, p. 100). The Democratic People's2Republic of2Korea (DPRK) administration presents a significant threat to the safety of its own citizens as a consequence of its misguided dual strategies of juche (self2reliance) and2sonkun (military-first). The country is still in dire straits despite previous, unsuccessful reform efforts and the influx of foreign help due to economic mishandling, poor leadership, carelessness, and coercive conduct on the part of the government (Park, 2013, p. 51).

 In contrast, personal deprivation, including food shortage or energy, particularly if it is dispersed unfairly throughout the country, can damage national unity, diminish national power, and heighten national instability. As a result, human insecurity alone can cause nations to feel insecure (Howe, 2013, p.226). Consequently, an unstable state may start to pose a conventional security threat to its neighbors. An appeal to rally around the flag, the2party, or in the case of the2DPRK, the military has frequently been employed in the fabrication of an2external aggression as a strategy for unifying a divided nation in times of distress. The "hostile" foreign environment is employed in the instance of North Korea2to both reinforce internal strategy and distract away from its shortcomings (Ireson, 2013, p. 100).

Conclusion

Human security has been distinguished by emphasizing the individuals as a security referent ever since it was first introduced in the academic literature. The approach outlined here aims to include people who are dealing with the most severe security issues in today's society and to show how their requirements can be met through a dual obligation, primarily to protect and then to support.  The phrase coined by King and Murray, "number of decades of future lifetime spent outside a condition of "generalized2poverty," is significant because it impliedly unites the two2strands of the2threat: years of2future life suggest a freedom from2harm that permits the progression of life; but the allusion to outside2a state of generalized2poverty suggests a freedom2from want that must be provided. In order to live in a condition of freedom2from fear, the person must be safeguarded from violent acts and intimidation. However, in order to be genuinely secure, a person's essential necessities should be addressed. The obligation is plainly placed on government and global stakeholders in contexts of an obligation to protect2and also to2provide for specific human beings by righteousness of our common humanity, regardless of the artificial2normative boundaries of nations, if the paradigm's aim is to reduce human suffering2by maximizing the2number of future life2years spent outside2of a state of2generalized economic hardship.

The democratization2of the media2has made it more difficult for administrations to engage in, conceal, or pass over suffering that occurs within their borders or those of2their fellow countries. The state-centric defense of country's interest for actions2or inaction in the current climate of global security is plain unjustifiable. But at the same period, national sovereignty2and worries about global security make it imperative to establish a comparatively high bar for any form of cross-border involvement. Though in fact there could need to be in-depth discussion about particular issues, with perspectives from a really global conversation granted an opportunity to be recognized, it is not hard to determine where to place this in theory. Both actions occurring under the two protocols qualify as "actions that strike the conscience2of humanity." That is, in order for fear or want to reach the threshold of catastrophe brought on by an urgent situation in the applicable society, either responsibility to2protect or responsibility to2provide interventions must be triggered. Interventions in2human security are permissible when this occurs due to a global duty to protect2and provide.

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